Free Speech and Picketing for  Unlawful Objectives by Editors, Law Review
NOTES
FREE SPEECH AND PICKETING FOR
"UNLAWFUL OBJECTIVES"
The constitutional status of the right to picket has been a fruitful source of
controversy since peaceful picketing was identified with freedom of speech in
Thornhill v. Alabama., Only two years after Justice Murphy had written the
Thornkill decision, Justice Frankfurter led a majority of the Supreme Court on
a retreat which culminated in the Ritter's Cafe2 case. The Court wavered at this
halfway house until 1943, and then abandoned its leadership by refusing to re-
view any more picketing cases.3 The recent decision in Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Company4 marks the first full statement on picketing from the Supreme
Court in six years. In an effort to organize nonunion ice peddlers, an ice truck
drivers union obtained agreements from Kansas City ice wholesalers to refrain
from selling ice to independent peddlers. Upon the refusal of the Empire Storage
& Ice Company to execute such an agreement a picket line was thrown around
the company's place of business. Truck drivers working for Empire's customers
refused to cross the picket line, thereby cutting off 85% of the company's busi-
' 3io U.S. 88 (194o). Note also the companion case, Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. xo6
(1940).
2 Carpenters & Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942). The Ritter
case has been widely regarded as a qualification of the original Thornhill doctrine. See Gregory,
Labor and the Law 361 (1948); Armstrong, Where Are We Going with Picketing?, 36 Calif. L.
Rev. x (1948); Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 Harv. L. Rev. i8o (1942).
3 Prior to the Giboney case the last full picketing case was Cafeteria Employees Union v.
Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943). Certiorari was subsequently denied in the following picketing
cases: Fred Wolferman, Inc. v. Root, 356 Mo. 976, 204 S.W. 2d 733 (1947), cert. den. 333
U.S. 837 (1948); Hotel & Restaurant Employees International Alliance v. Greenwood, 249
Ala. 265, 30 So. 2d 696 (I947), cert. den. 332 U.S. 847 (1948); Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board v. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers Union, 238 Wis. 379, 299 N.W. 31 (1941), cert. den.
316 U.S. 668 (1942). In Denver Milk Producers, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 1i6 Colo. 389, 183 P. 2d 529 (1947), appeal dismissed 334 U.S. 8og (1948), the Supreme
Court declined to review the Colorado court's order restraining secondary peaceful picketing.
With Justices Black and Murphy dissenting, the Court announced per curiam: "Because of the
inadequacy of the record, we decline to decide the constitutional issues involved. The appeal
is dismissed without prejudice to the determination in further proceedings of any questions
arising under the federal Constitution." Ibid., at 809. InU.S. v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. i (i947), the
Court again declined to pass on the constitutionality of a statute applied to prevent a feather-
bedding picket. The lower court had declared the statute unconstitutional. 68 F. Supp. 845
(D.C. Ill., 1946). But the Supreme Court considered it "inappropriate to reach the merits of
this cdnstitutional question now. As we have pointed out, we have consistently said that we
would refrain from passing on the constitutionality of statutes in advance of the necessity
to do so." U.S. v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. i, 10 (947).
4 69 S. Ct. 684 (1949).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
ness. Empire obtained an injunction on its complaint that the efforts of union
members to restrain Empire from selling to nonunion drivers were in violation
of the Missouri anti-trade restraint statute, and that an agreement by Empire
to refuse to make such sales would violate the same statute. The state Supreme
Court affirmed, agreeing that the picketing was designed to force Empire to be-
come a party to an unlawful transportation combination, and that the injunc-
tion to prevent picketing for such an unlawful purpose did not contravene the
union's right of free speech. The United States Supreme Court, through jus-
tice Black, unanimously affirmed the state court decision on the ground that the
Thornhill doctrine did not "exten[d] its immunity to speech or writing used as
an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute."s Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Company supplements the Ritter's Cafe case and confirms
the line of authority well established in the state courts that peaceful picketing
for unlawful objects is not protected by the guarantees of the Thornhill doctrine.
But whether any vestiges of Tkornhill v. Alabama can in fact be salvaged from
the Giboney case invites discussion.
I
The Thornhill case and its companion decision, Carlson v. California,6 in-
volved blanket statutory proscriptions of all picketing. In holding these state
laws invalid, the Court relied upon an earlier dictum of Juctice Brandeis7 to
convert picketing from a tolerated privilege into a full-fledged constitutional
right. Speaking for the Court, Justice Murphy announced that "[in the cir-
cumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts
of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is
guaranteed by the Constitution. ' 8 Justice Murphy's meaning was clarified the
following year, when the Court handed down the decision of AFL v. Swing.9
A beauty workers' union had attempted to unionize Swing's beauty parlor
by peaceful picketing. Swing obtained an injunction on the ground that there
was no immediate employer-employee dispute involved. On appeal the Court
reaffirmed the Thornhill rule and held that, in the absence of legislation, state
courts could not restrict a union's right of free speech simply "by drawing the
circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to
contain only an employer and those directly employed by him."o
5 Ibid., at 688. 6 310 U.S. io6 (i94o).
7In Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 3oi U.S. 468 (I937), the Court decided that pro-
picketing legislation did not deprive an employer of due process of law or of equal protection
of the laws. But Justice Brandeis uttered an equivocal statement in the course of the decision
which has been widely misinterpreted. "Members of a union might, without special statutory
authorization by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is
guaranteed by the constitution." Ibid., at 478.
8 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
9 312 U.S. 321 (941). The same day, in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadow-
moor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941), the Court established that picketing "in the context of
violence" was not protected by the guarantees of the Thornhill doctrine.
10AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (94i).
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The holding of the Swing case was amplified in Bakery and Pastry Drivers Lo-
cal v. Wohl."x In an effort to compel independent pastry peddlers to employ un-
ion relief drivers, a truck drivers union picketed bakeries which were supplying
the independents. Since the peddlers were self-employed, the trial court had
issued an injunction on the ground that there was no labor dispute. The Court
reiterated the rule of the Swing case, stating that the absence of a labor dispute
as defined by state law did not impair the union's constitutional rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. But while token respect was paid to freedom of speech,
the Court also indicated that picketing was subject to restrictions not dearly
encompassed within orthodox free speech doctrine.12 These caveats to the Wohl
case were elevated to holdings in Carpenters & Joiners Union of America v. Rit-
ter's Cafe.'3 A building contractor was erecting a building for Ritter under a con-
tract which did not require employment of union labor. The defendant union
picketed a cafe owned by Ritter to compel the hiring of union workers by the
contractor. This picketing was enjoined as violating the state anti-trust law,
and the Supreme Court affirmed the injunction five to four. Speaking for the
majority, Justice Frankfurter declared that the states could lawfully confine
the "sphere of communication" within the "economic context of the real dis-
pute." The Court thus implied that the organized carpenters were constitution-
ally protected in picketing nonunion building operations, but not enterprises
outside the building industry. In preference to a clear-and-present-danger ap-
proach, the Court employed a unity-of-interest rationale to distinguish the
Wohl case from the Ritter case.'4 In so rejecting the free speech touchstone
of Thornhill v. Alabama, the Ritter case has been regarded as a major qualifica-
tion of the basic Thornhill doctrine.15
The Supreme Court's decision this year in the Giboney case will undoubtedly
-. add fuel to the controversy engendered by the Ritter's Cafe decision. This con-
" 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
- "A state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circumstances even peaceful
picketing by an individual. But so far as we can tell, respondents' mobility and their insulation
from the public as middlemen made it practically impossible for petitioners to make known
their legitimate grievances to the public whose patronage was sustaining the peddler system
except by the means here employed and contemplated; and those means are such as to have
slight, if any, repercussions upon the interests of strangers to the issue." Ibid., at 775. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas commented: "If the opinion in this case means that a
State can prohibit picketing when it is effective, but may not prohibit it when it is ineffective,
then I think we have made a basic departure from Thornhill v. Alabama." Ibid., at 775.
3 315 U.S. 722 (1942). The Ritter and Wohl cases were decided the same day.
14 "The dispute there related to the conditions under which bakery products were sold
and delivered to retailers. The business of the retailers was therefore directly involved in the
dispute. In picketing the retail establishments, the union members would only be following the
subject-matter of their dispute." Carpenters & Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 3 IS
U.S. 722, 727 (1942). A similar problem arose in Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942), where a union picketed the homes of nonstriking
employees. However the case was decided on other grounds.
IS Note 2 supra.
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troversy will be intensified by the fact that Justice Black's opinion is susceptible
to divergent interpretations. Some critics will read the decision as holding that
picketing by the union drivers was itself a violation of the anti-trade restraint
statute.z6 Others will contend that inducing Empire to violate the Missouri
statute was in substance a criminal solicitation.17 Or it may be urged that the
picketing was intrinsically lawful, but was tainted with an "illegal purpose."' 8
If the unlawful-object9 approach underlies the Giboney case, the Thornhill doc-
trine would require that the accomplishment of the union's illegal purpose
threaten a clear and present danger of substantive evil. Consideration of the
probable success of the picketing and the offensiveness of its "object" would be
vital factors in the decision. Such consideration, if present in the Giboney case,
was cast only in veiled language.2' Justice Black's opinion thus leaves undeter-
mined the area of state discretion in defining unlawful objects. If picketing is
still to be an exercise of simon-pure free speech, the "objects" would have to be
tested by clear-and-present-danger techniques. If picketing is pure economic
warfare, the guiding principle would be public policy in defining the allowable
area of economic conflict. If picketing is a hybrid activity, some fair method
should be developed to differentiate the privileged from the unprivileged.
Presuming some identification of the peaceful picket with free speech, how far
can picketing be restricted by declaring its purposes illegal?
6 
"Thus all of appellants' activities... constituted a single and integrated course of con-
duct, which was in violation of Missouri's valid law. In this situation, the injunction did no
more than enjoin an offense against Missouri law, a felony." Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Company, 69 S. Ct. 684, 688 (i949).
17 The gravamen of the offense here would be that the picketing "was to induce Empire
to violate the Missouri law by acquiescing in unlawful demands to agree not to sell ice to non-
union peddlers." Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Company, 69 S. Ct. 684, 690 ('949). Fox v.
Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915), a solicitation case, was relied upon in this section of the
Court's argument. The opinion of the Missouri court, which was adopted by the Supreme
Court, emphasized that inducing Empire to violate the anti-trade restraining statute was
the gist of the union's illegal conduct.
is The Court regarded the picketing merely as an incident of the union's transportation
combination, and consequently refused to consider it "in isolation." Similarly, the Court
argued that"we can[notl say that the publication here should not have been restrained because
of the possibility of separating the picketing conduct into illegal and legal parts." Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Company, 69 S. Ct. 684, 69o (I949). The inference seems to be that the
picketing would have been lawful, if regarded "in isolation."
'9 The illegal-purpose approach to picketing has dictum support from the Wohl case.
Counsel for the vendors had contended that a subsequent decision of the New York Court of
Appeals established the rationale of the injunction as based on the unlawful-object doctrine.
This was ignored because it "lack[ed] the deliberateness and formality of certification, and was
uttered in a case where the question of the existence of a right to free speech was neither raised
nor considered." Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local v. Wohi, 315 U.S. 769, 774 (1942).
20 "There was clear danger, imminent and immediate, that unless restrained, appellants
would succeed in making that policy [of the Missouri law] a dead letter insofar as purchases
by nonunion men were concerned." Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Company, 69 S. Ct. 684,
691 (i949).
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II
The pre-eminence of the unlawful-object test in the state courts is largely due
to the doctrine enunciated in the Swing and Wohl cases. Judges who had main-
tained that local anti-injunction acts were the only bars to the restriction of
picketing, were informed by the Supreme Court that peaceful picketing was im-
mune from the injunction irrespective of such legislation. Presumably the ab-
sence of a state-defined labor dispute did not open the door to injunctive relief
unless the picketing could be brought within the scope of the Ritter's Cafe deci-
sion. The unlawful-object test thus furnished a convenient alternative for those
courts which did not approve of the Thornhill doctrine. Without openly defying
the Supreme Court, these courts could still argue that lawful means could not be
used to support unlawful ends.
This revival of the unlawful-object rationale also had its disadvantages. The
definition of "object" has always been a source of much confusion to the courts.
A great body of distinctions has been built up to differentiate motive, purpose,
and intention, as well as to account for "immediate" and "ultimate" objects.21
The necessity of extracting "purpose" from a vast continuum of means and ends
led to great uncertainty in the picketing cases. The Missouri Supreme Court
held that picketing could be enjoined when a lawful and unlawful purpose were
"coupled" together,2" while in Oregon a combination of lawful and unlawful
purposes was privileged. 23 The California Supreme Court authorized peaceful
picketing for unlawful objects which were "means" to lawful ends,24 although
in a later case it was conceded that "the public interest may tip the scales
one way or another."' 5 In the majority of cases the courts have chosen with-
out explanation the objective to be tested.26
Even when union purpose has been established, the basic problem of legality
must still be met. The decisions reflect standard problems which arise in the
judicial definition of the allowable area of economic conflict. In the teeth of the
Thornhill doctrine, the state courts have been surprisingly uniform in subjecting
picketing to the same scrutiny as other devices of union pressure. The manner in
2- Rest., Torts § 777 Comment a (1939); 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargain-
ing § 66 (294o).
- Fred Wolferman, Inc. v. Root, 356 Mo. 976, 204 S.W. 2d 733 (i947), cert. den. 333 U.S.
837 (1948).
2 Peters v. Central Labor Council, 179 Ore. r, 169 P. 2d 870 (1946).
'4 Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27 Cal. 2d 599,
165 P. 2d 891 (1946). Compare Burlington Transportation Co. v. Hathaway, 234 Ia. 135,
12 N.W. 2d 167 (1943).
"SNorthwestern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union, 31 Cal. 2d 441, 189
P. 2d 277 (1948).
26The American Law Institute has submitted a definition of "object" which avoids the
typical difficulties: "An 'object' of concerted action by workers against an employer is an act
required in good faith by them of the employer as the condition of their voluntary ceasing
their concerted action against him." Rest., Torts § 777 (1939).
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which the dosed-shop picket has been handled discloses varied approaches to
picketing regulation. The typical situation arises when a minority or outside
union pickets an open-shop or a nonunion employer to compel him to sign a
closed-shop contract. Some courts, notably those of Massachusetts,7 have sim-
ply declared the dosed shop an unlawful object, and have enjoined the picketing
without further comment.25 Other courts have obtained the same result by de-
fining "labor dispute" narrowly enough to preclude the application of local anti-
injunction acts, thus ignoring the Supreme Court's mandate in the Swing
case.2 9 More ingenious courts have argued that minority unions may not picket
to compel breach of the employers' statutory duty to contract only with the ma-
jority representative.3° Courts upholding the closed-shop picket have generally
done so because the object was deemed lawful rather than on free speech
grounds.3Z
A related purpose served by picketing is the protest of contracts or certifica-
tion awarded a rival union. Some courts have proceeded on the theory that the
absence of a labor dispute opens the door to injunctive relief.3 Certification of a
rival union is thus held to terminate the minority's privilege of applying further
pressure, supposedly because the minority is not a competent party to a "labor
dispute." Where the Thornhilldoctrine is taken more seriously, courts have relied
on unlawful-object principles. Thus it is held an illegal purpose to frustrate the
statutory mechanism of majority rule by defying the rival union's certification.33
On the other hand, where picketing is permitted, the distinction is drawn be-
27David Bros. Fisheries v. Pimental, 78 N.E. 2d 93 (Mass., 1948); Colonial Press v. Ellis,
321 Mass. 495, 74 N.E. 2d 1 (1947); Fashioncraft v. Halperin, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N.E. 2d i
(1943).
28In Consumers Sand & Gravel Co. v. Kalamazoo Bldg. Council, 321 Mich. 361, 32 N.W.
2d 531 (1948), a closed-shop picket was held unlawful under a "right to work" statute.
29 Gazzam v. Building Service Union, 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188 P. 2d 97 (i947); Markham &
Callow v. International Woodworkers of America, 170 Ore. 517, 135 P. 2d 727 (1943); Shively
v. Garage Employees Local Union, 6 Wash. 2d 56o, 1o8 P. 2d 354 (1940). In AFL v. Bain,
i65 Ore. I83, ,o6 P. 2d 544 (194o), a statute prohibiting picketing in the absence of a "bona
fide labor dispute" was held unconstitutional.
30 Fred Wolferman, Inc. v. Root, 356 Mo. 976, 204 S.W. 2d 733 (1947), cert. den. 333 U.S.
837 (1948); R. H. White Co. v. Murphy, 3io Mass. 510,38 N.E. 2d 685 (1942).
31 Iacomnis Restaurant v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local, :6 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
65o8o (Ohio Ct. Com. Pls., 1948); Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 27 Cal. 2d 599, 165 P. 2d 891 (1946); Twitchell-Champlin Co. v. Conary, ii
C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 63483 (Super. Ct. Me., 1946); East Lake Drug Co. v. Drug Clerks Union,
298 N.W. 722 (Minn., 1941).
3- North East Texas Motor Lines v. Dickson, 16 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 65054 (Tex. S. Ct.;
1949); Gulf Oil Corporation v. Smallman, 27o App. Div. i29, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 495 (i945),
Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesman's Local, 288 N.Y. i88, 42 N.E. 2d 480
(1942); Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v. International Woodworkers of America, 4 Wash.
2d 62, 102 P. 2d 270 (I940).
33Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash. 2d 193, 177 P. 2d 873 (947);
Serval Slide Fasteners v. Molfetta, 188 N.Y. Misc. 787, 70 N.Y.S. 2d 411 (i947). The same
principle has been employed to restrict the right to strike. See Majority Rule and the Right
To Strike, i6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 307 (i949).
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tween persuasion of the employer to deal with the minority union, and recruit-
ing employees for organizational purposes. The Swing case is thus appropriately
invoked, and picketing is deemed an exercise of the right of free speech.34 The
recruiting picket has generally been well received by the courts on the ground
that spreading the benefits of collective bargaining is a legitimate labor objec-
tive.35 Objectives tainted with color discrimination have been declared unlawful
on each of the occasions upon which the issue has arisen.36 Finally, there is a
large class of cases enjoining picketing for objects which have been declared il-
legal by statute. State anti-trust legislation has been invoked to enjoin picketing
designed to enforce secondary boycotts, 37 and similar results have been obtained
under the Taft-Hartley Act.-3
34 State v. Superior Court, 24 Wash. 2d 314, x64 P. 2d 662 (1945); Blossom Dairy Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 125 W.Va. I65, 23 S.E. 2d 645 (1942); Culinary
Workers Local v. Busy Bee Cafe, 57 Ariz. 514, irS P. 2d 246 (194x). During the war, however,
one court enjoined a minority union picket of an employer who had entered into a union-shop
agreement with a rival union, on the ground that "[o]ne of the substantive evils which Con-
gress has a right to prevent and for the prevention of which the power of the nation is now
being asserted, is the breakdown of productive processes in the time of national emergency."
Markham & Callow v. International Woodworkers of America, 170 Ore. 517, I35 P. 2d 727
(1943).
35 Standard Grocer Co. v. Local No. 406, AFL, 321 Mich. 276, 32 N.W. 2d 519 (1948);
Hennigh v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, ii C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 63o94 (D.C. Colo.,
1946); Denver Local Union v. Buckingham Transportation Co., xo8 Colo. 419, r8 P. 2d
1o88 (1941). However in Denver Milk Producers, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 116 Colo. 389, I83 P. 2d 529 (1947), appeal dismissed 334 U.S. 809 (1948), such
picketing was enjoinable because the absence of an employer-employee relationship precluded
the existence of a labor dispute. Compare Silkworth v. Local 575, AFL, 309 Mich. 746, 16
N.W. 2d 145 (I944). The Texas Supreme Court recently held that a statute limiting picketing
to controversies between an employer and the majority representative of his employees was
unconstitutional. International Union of Operating Engineers v. Cox, i6 C.C.H. Lab. Cas,
65053 (Tex. S. Ct., 1949).
36 Hughes v. Superior Court, 15 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 64824 (Calif., 1948), cert. granted 69
S. Ct. 930 (I949); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 3 29 (1944).
37 Turner v. Zanes, 2o6 S.W. 2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App., 1947); cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Company, 69 S. Ct. 684 (1949); Harper v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 489, 18 N.W. 2d 905
(I945).
38 Section 8(b) (4 )(A) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents... to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike
or a concerted refusal ... to perform any services, where an object thereof is ... forcing or
requiring any employer.., to cease doing business with any other person." 6i Stat. x36-61
(i947), 29 U.S.C.A. § Ii et seq. (1947). The courts have not hesitated to apply this section
to picketing. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Sperry, 15 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
64814 (C.A. ioth, 1948); Printing Union v. LeBaron, 23 L.R.R.M. 2145 (C.A. 9 th, 1948);
LeBus v. Pacific Coast Marine Firemen Assoc., i5 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 64794 (D.C. La., 1948).
Compare Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (N.Y., 1948).
Section 8(c) provides that "[t]he expressing of any views, argument, or opinion... shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act,
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." But the legis-
lative history of this section indicates that it was designed primarily to safeguard employer
free speech. Conference Report, H.R. 510, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (1947). See H.R. 245, 8oth
Cong. ist Sess. (I947). "In brief outline, the bill accomplishes the following:... (z3) It
outlaws picketing of a place of business where the proprietor is not involved in a labor dis-
pute with his employees.!.
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The overwhelming affirmation of the unlawful-object test in the state courts
has now the blessings of a Supreme Court which unanimously affirmed the
Giboney case. In the face of this green light from the Supreme Court, how far
will they now extend the unlawful-object test? Previous application of the illegal
purpose technique has divided the state courts into three camps: i) those which
have not questioned state power to define unlawful objects,39 2) those adopting
a balance-of-equities approach to measure the asserted illegality against "the
requirement of competition and some measure of equality in the economic strug-
gle between the seller and the producer of services,"40 and 3) those few courts
which have tested the prohibited objects for "substantive evils" which would
justify restriction of free speech.41
Perhaps the significant factor which explains the continued vitality of the un-
lawful-object test in the picketing cases, is the strength it draws from the
orthodox common law of verbal regulation. The law of criminal solicitations has
long recognized that speech for illegal purposes is punishable,42 although the use
of the injunction raises the special problem of previous restraint.43 The critical
problem lies in locating the area of state discretion in creating unlawful objects.
Six basic illegal ends have hitherto been significant: i) inducing breach of con-
tract,44 2) inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice or to vio-
late other statutory duties,45 3) inducing violation of anti-trust acts,46 4) induc-
39 The Massachusetts cases are the outstanding examples. Note 27 supra.
40 Northwestern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union, 31 Cal. 2d 441, i89
P. 2d 277 (1948); Shively v. Garage Employees Local Union, 6 Wash. 2d 56o, ioS P. 2d 354
(1940); cf. Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E. 2d 12 (i947).
4r State v. Superior Court, 24 Wash. 2d 314, 333, 164 P. 2d 662, 672 (i945). "Peaceful
picketing is a manifestation of the exercise of freedom of speech and it can be restrained only
upon those grounds and conditions which warrant restraint in any other case involving freedom
of speech." See also Ex Parte Waltrip, 207 S.W. 2d 872 (Tex. Crim. App., 1948); Markham &
Callow v. International Woodworkers of America, 170 Ore. 517, 135 P. 2d 727 (I943).
42 See Verbal Acts and Ideas-the Common Sense of Free Speech, i6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
328 (z949); Curran, Solicitation: A Substantive Crime, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 499 (933); Fox v.
Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915). But see Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (948).
43 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (i93i). However, in Carpenters & Joiners Union of
America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942), the issue was not even raised. Moreover the
Court has made it clear that libellous picketing is enjoinable, although allowance must be
made for "conventional give-and-take in our economic and political controversies...
Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
44 International Association of Machinists v. Downtown Employees, 13 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
64o53 (Tex. Civ. App., 1947); Chattanooga Blowpipe & Roofing Co.v. SheetMetal Workers
Local, 12 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 63706 (Tenn., r947); Gulf Oil Corp. v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, I85 N.Y. Misc. 4o9, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 24 (1945).
45 Fred Wolferman, Inc. v. Root, 356 Mo. 976, 204 S.W. 2d 733 (i947), cert. den. 333 U.S.
837 (1948); Serval Slide Fasteners v. Molfetta, i88 N.Y. Misc. 787, 7o N.Y.S. 2d 411 (1947);
Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash. 2d 193, 177 P. 2d 873 (I947); Turner v.
Zanes, 206 S.W. 2d i44 (Tex. Civ. App., 1947); Burlington Transportation Co. v. Hathaway,
234 Iowa 135, 12 N.W. 2d 167 (1943)-
46 Note 37 supra.
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ing discriminatory hiring practices,47 5) inducing a closed-shop contract,4 and
6) inducing a secondary boycott.49 Clearly the courts are operating on the outer
fringes of the solicitation rationale. And can it be said that the accomplish-
ment of these "objects" constitutes a clear and present danger of substantive
evil?
lI
The major controversy over the right to picket centers around the categories
of liberty of utterance and economic warfare. Whether unlawful objects must
be tested by clear-and-present-danger techniquesO or by legislative and ju-
dicial preference, depends largely upon which concept most successfully assimi-
lates picketing speech. The effectiveness of picketing is based upon its appeal
to class solidarity rather than upon the justice of its ends. It functions as a signal
for the alignment of social forces hostile to the picketee, on grounds which are
independent of any particular labor controversy. Hence, while not properly
"persuasion," it is nevertheless a form of communication designed to enlist the
cooperation of persons sympathetic to the interests of organized labor. But be-
cause there is no conceptual peg between the tweedledum of economic pressure
and the tweedledee of "pure speech," picketing has been left to vacillate in the
undefined area between the competing categories. Justice Douglas, concurring
in the Wohl case, was able to reconcile this middle ground with the Thornhill de-
cision by distinguishing the speech from the nonspeech aspects of picketing.
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves
patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may
induce action of one kind or another quite irrespective of the ideas which are
being disseminated. Hence, those aspects of picketing make it the subject of re-
strictive regulation. But since 'dissemination of information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute' is constitutionally protected, a State may not define
'labor dispute' so narrowly as to accomplish indirectly what it may not accom-
plish directly."''
The use of speech to further economic ends has been a sore spot to the Su-
preme Court upon more than one occasion. The employer free speech cases re-
flect one aspect of the ambivalent attitude toward economic speech. Although an
47 Note 36 supra. 48 Notes 27-31 supra.
49 United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Sperry, i$ C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 64814
(C.A. ioth, 1948); Printing Union v. LeBaron, 23 L.R.R.M. 2145 (C.A. 9th, 1948); LeBus v.
Pacific Coast Marine Firemen Assoc., iS C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 64794 (D.C. La., 1948); Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Board v. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers Union, 238 Wis. 379, 299 N.W.
31 (1941), cert. den. 316 U.S. 668 (1942).
so The Supreme Court's stand on the clear-and-present-danger test was clearly stated in
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (i94i). "What finally emerges from the 'clear and
present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely seri-
ous and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished." Com-
pare Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (z947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
s' Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (942). See Jaffe, In Defense
of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1037 (i943).
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employer is free to take sides on controversial issues, his activities are "forever
suspect" because of the possibilities of coercion which the context of his remarks
may disclose.52 Commercial advertising is another form of economic communica-
tion that has been placed outside the sphere of free speech guarantees. 3 Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has struck down restrictions on the "sale" of Je-
hovah's Witness literature, even where the seller has made his living thereby.S4
Presumably this is based on the ground that the content of the literature is not
of a commercial nature. But in Thomas v. Collinsss the Court swung back to the
middle of the road. Justice Rutledge there announced: "The idea is not sound
therefore that the First Amendment's safeguards are wholly inapplicable to
business or economic activity. And it does not resolve where the line shall be
drawn in a particular case merely to urge.., that an organization for which the
rights of free speech and free assembly are claimed is one 'engaged in business
activities,' or that the individual who leads it in exercising these rights receives
compensation for doing so."
'
s
6
The reluctance of the courts to extend constitutional protection to commer-
cial speech probably derives from the distinction between speech in the public
interest and speech in the private interest. Since economic communication is
identified with private gain, it has not generally been held entitled to constitu-
tional protection. The Thornhill doctrine blurred this distinction by identifying
the private interest of labor with the public interest at large. Picketing was
equated with discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of
labor disputes, and this discussion the court deemed "indispensable to the ef-
fective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the
destiny of modem industrial society."7 In the light of this principle picketing
has been permitted wider latitude than any other form of economic communi-
cation, even in the face of its obvious nonverbal characteristics.
The root of the differentiation of picketing speech from other utterances in-
spired by prospects of economic gain must lie in the policies which define the
,- NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F. 2d 9o5 (C.C.A. 6th, i94o), cert. den. 312 U.S. 689
(1941). Compare NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941); Schweitzer v.
NLRB, i44F. 2d 520 (App. D.C., 1944).
3 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). See Wolff, Unfair Competition by
Truthful Disparagement, 47 Yale L.J. 1304 (1938). In Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229
U.S. 288 (1913), the Supreme Court upheld a post-office regulation denying 2d-class mailing
privileges to publications "designed primarily for advertising purposes." Cf. Hannegan v.
Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
S4 Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. io5(1943). Similarly, the distribution of handbills advertising religious literature could not be
prohibited by city ordinance. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (i943).
ss323 U.S. Si6 (ig4). In a five to four decision, the Court held unconstitutional a Texas
statute requiring union organizers to get permission from the Secretary of State prior to
soliciting union memberships. The Court conceded that this was economic activity.
S61bid., at 531.
s7 Thornhill v. Alabama, 31o U.S. 88, Io3 (1940).
NOTES
lawful area of self-help in labor disputes.S The question remains whether any
such policy justifies pegging the right on the level of a constitutional privilege.
If picketing is sufficiently important, pro-picketing legislation would seem the
more desirable alternative. If the requisite political power is lacking, is it the
office of the judiciary to remedy the deficiency? Surely the vigorous role assumed
by the legislatures in the regulation of industrial conflict militates strongly
against judicial intervention.
Should the rise of the unlawful-object test be welcomed as a qualification of an
unsound doctrine? If unlawful objects are subject to clear-and-present-danger
techniques, a substantial part of the Thornhill doctrine may yet be salvaged
from the Giboney case. But the extensive pre-Giboney use of the unlawful-object
test indicates that such restraint will not be exercised. Continued lip-service to
the Thornhill doctrine seems an unpardonable subterfuge if the creation of un-
lawful objects is governed only by judicial and legislative whimsy. The Supreme
Court has argued that the Giboney case does not qualify Thornhill v. Alabama. A
generous interpretation of the decision may support this contention. The critical
test will come when the Court decides whether a state may outlaw the closed-
shop picket or recruiting picket by employing the illegal purpose device. If such
objects do not threaten a clear and present danger of substantive evil, the Su-
preme Court will have to elect between affirmation or repudiation of the Thorn-
hill doctrine59 The real problem must then be faced. Are the courts or the legis-
latures the proper organs of labor policy?
CHURCH AND SPIEGEL IN PERSPECTIVE
I
In two recent companion cases dealing with the federal estate tax, Com'r v.
Estate of Church' and Estate of Spiegel v. Com'r,2 the members of the Supreme
Court wrote six opinions reflecting the provocative treatment of the subject
they belabor. The opinions-two majority, three dissenting, and one dissenting
in part-reached the impressive length of 55,000 words. These opinions were
s
8 See Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 Pub. Policy 8o (z942); Meikle-
john, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self Government 63 (1948); Holmes, J., in Vegelahn v.
Gunter, z67 Mass. 92, io6, 44 N.E. 1077, xo8o (1896): "The true grounds of decision are con-
siderations of policy and of social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be
attained merely by logic and general propositions of law which nobody disputes. Propositions
as to public policy rarely are unanimously accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, are capable
of unanswerable proof."
s9 The Supreme Court has already granted certiorari to review a case in which picketing to
induce an employer to adopt a discriminatory hiring policy was enjoined. Hughes v. Superior
Court, i5 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 64824 (Calif., 1948), cert. granted 69 S. Ct. 930 (1949). The
impending Hughes case will be the acid test for the Thornhill doctrine. The Court's recent
denial of certiorari in the less critical case of Pa. L.R.B. v. Chester and Delaware Counties
Bartenders Local, 361 Pa. 246 (1949), cert. den. 69 S. Ct. 812 (1949), may indicate that the
Hughes case was chosen specifically for this purpose.
x 335 U.S. 632 (1949). 2335 U.S. 701 (i949).
